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Stanford Howdyshell
Kent State University
On Realism and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction
Abstract
In this  paper I  will  discuss the Pessimistic  Meta-Induction put forth by Larry Laudan in  his  paper  A
Confutation of Convergent Realism and discuss how it overcomes the No Miracles argument for scientific
realism. I will then reconcile these two positions through the theory that scientific terms posit and refer
to models of reality that are relevantly similar to how the world is. 
This paper will begin with a discussion of the No Miracles argument and Pessimistic Meta-Induction,
resulting in doubt that scientific terms genuinely refer to objects in the world. In order to overcome the
anti-realist position that the Pessimistic Meta-Induction has resulted in, I will then put forth a form of
realism that does not rely on the genuine reference of terms. This being that scientific terms refer to
models and structures that are relevantly similar to objects in reality.  This will  be done with a brief
discussion in the history of science, particularly with a discussion of the caloric fluid theory of heat and
the evolution of the theory of light, first as a wave in either, then as a wave in space, and finally as a
‘wavicle’. This will result in the aforementioned position that retains a form of realism, but is still able to
overcome the Pessimistic Meta-Induction.
Introduction
The realist positon often maintains that the terms used in scientific study and the scientific theories that
the study produces genuinely refer to entities and structures that exist within reality. They maintain that
this is the best explanation for the incredible success of science and the special epistemic weight given to
science. In this paper we will explore an objection to this view, the pessimistic meta-induction and how
this  objection relates  to  the no miracles  argument  for  realism.  We will  then explore  an alternative
explanation to genuine reference for the success of science. This alternative being that scientific terms
posit and refer to models of reality that are relevantly similar to how the world is. We will then look at a
couple of possible explications of the idea of relevant-simularity.
The No Miracles Argument and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction
The realist position often takes the form that the entities and structures posited by scientific theories do
actually exist in reality. More so, these “observational and theoretical terms within the theories of a
mature science genuinely refer” (Laudan 1109), meaning that when a scientist uses terms such as ‘atom’
or ‘electron’ she is referring to entities that exist in the world. When she says “electrons have a negative
charge” she is referring to the entity in the world and describing the property of that entity that the
entity actually has. 
One of the main arguments for the truth of this position is the no miracles argument. This argument
states that our current scientific  theories are incredibly successful in terms of  explaining observable
phenomena and making prediction that are empirically  testable and that turn out to be empirically
verified.  As more experimentation occurs the theories are then more and more empirically  verified,
confidence in  them increases  accordingly.  The realist  then asserts  that  the best  explanation for the
theories’ success is that it accurately explains reality and that the entities that are posited in the theory
genuinely do exist, and thus when the terms are used they are genuinely referring to the entities in
reality.  If  this  were not  the case,  says  the realist,  it  would be incredibly  unlikely  that  our  scientific
theories would work so well. If terms did not genuinely refer, the success of modern science would be a
miracle. Thus the main reason for the realist position is that success is a reliable indicator of the truth of
a theory.
A problem with this line of argumentation is that “false theories, as well as true ones, [can] have true
consequences” (Laudan 1123). For example, the geocentric view of the solar system had been making
accurate predictions for over one thousand years at the time of Copernicus, for “even Copernicus’s more
elaborate proposal was neither simpler nor more accurate than Ptolemy’s system” (Kuhn 76). The realist
could reply to this example in two ways. First, that over time the heliocentric model of the solar system
was better verified than the geocentric model, and with further verification can be said to accurately
describe the solar system. The second way to respond would be to say that the entities in question were
real  in  this  case,  and  thus  the  terms  were  genuinely  referring,  but  that  the  problem  was  one  of
conceptualization and organization. It got the structures and entities right, but the relationships between
them wrong. 
To the latter argument the critic could say that those relationships are in fact part of the structure of
reality that the realist believes theories are genuinely referring to. To the former objection he can say
that while the heliocentric model of the solar system is the best verified theory we have so far1, but why
could there not, in the future be a new theory that is then even better verified than the current theory?
Would the current theory still be thought to genuinely refer?
The critic can then offer up more examples of theories that were very well confirmed in their times but
would  eventually  be  replaced.  In  their  times,  realists  would  have  maintained  that  the  entities  and
structures posited by the theories did exist in reality for the same reasons that current realists maintain
that the entities and structures posited by our current theories genuinely refer to entities and structures
in  the world.  Some examples  that  Laudan provided are  the effluvial  theory  of  static  electricity,  the
phlogiston  theory  of  chemistry,  the  caloric  and  vibration  theories  of  heat,  the  optical  and
electromagnetic ether theories, and the theory of circular inertia (1120). 
1 We are here just using it to talk about the planetary revolution within the solar system and granting that it is not 
a pure heliocentrism.
A common move for the realist is to then say that realism only applies to mature sciences, and all of the
counterexamples  are  of  immature  sciences.  The  problem  with  this  is  that  the  distinction  between
mature and immature sciences is not clear. It seems to be arbitrarily created to make current science
distinct from historical science. Any line drawn to exclude Laudan’s examples would also exclude areas of
science that the realist would like to preserve. More so, there seems to be no reason for the critic to
grant  this  distinction  exists.  Even if  the  critic  grants  the distinction  between mature and  immature
sciences,  it  still  does not save the realist’s  position,  because even “if  the realist  restricts  himself  to
explaining only how the ‘mature’ sciences work…then he will have completely failed in his ambition to
explain why science in general is successful” (1121). In maintaining this distinction, the realist is giving up
the no miracles argument when it comes to immature sciences. If the realist doesn’t grant that immature
sciences are genuinely referring,  then there is  no explanation for their  success outside of  luck, or a
miracle. Thus, the realist has given up that “the success (of a scientific theory) is a reliable indicator of
truth” (Curd, Cover, Pincock, 1258), and without this premise, the no miracles argument has fallen apart.
Once the anti-realist effectively reduced the structural differences between past, unsuccessful theories
and  our  current  theories  to  irrelevance  then  the  failure  of  past  theories  to  genuinely  refer,  it  is
reasonable to believe that our current theories also fail to genuinely refer, and will be replaced by other
theories in time.
An Alternative
Laudan showed, with a fair amount of success, that there is no clear correlation between the success of
a theory on empirical grounds and whether that theory genuinely refers to entities or structures that
exist in reality. Once the success of a theory has been removed as a reliable indicator for the truth of a
theory and the structures and entities it posits, it seems that we have little reason to believe our current
theories are true, or that the entities that they posit  exist.  If  science does not refer to entities and
structures that exist, or if we have no way of knowing if they do, how can we explain the extraordinary
success of the sciences?
A way to resolve this ‘no miracles’ argument for realism and the pessimistic meta-induction could be,
rather than embrace the truth of reference that realism endorses or the skepticism of the anti-realist, to
formulate a middle ground, a pessimistic realism, as it were. 
In order to do this we will consider two cases of theories that were highly successful in their time, but
have been shown to be false,  and whose central  tenets refer to entities that do not exist.  The first
example is the caloric fluid theory of heat. This theory posited that heat was a form of fluid that would
flow from a warmer object to a cooler one until an equilibrium was reached, much like how water will
flow from higher pressure to lower pressure systems until an equilibrium is reached. This theory was
extremely successful, both in the theoretical and practical realms. Thermodynamics flourished and many
of the engines and power generation cycles that were developed under the caloric fluid model were
developed and optimized to the point where they are still used today.
Unfortunately caloric fluid does not exist. The theory did not genuinely refer to entities within the world.
This serves as an effective counter-example to the ‘no miracles’ argument. Here we have a case of a
theory that had a strong record of empirical success, but genuinely did not refer. The realist could then
respond  that  while  not  genuinely  referring,  the  caloric  fluid  was  approximately  true.  This  move  is
dubious, the entities posited by caloric fluid theory and the entities posited by the replacing theory, the
mean kinetic energy of constituent molecules (MKE), in no way resemble each other. If we were to grant
that  caloric  fluid  theory  is  “approximately  true”  we  would  be  saying  that  caloric  fluid  theory  is
approximately MKE. Most people would not be willing to grant this. For similar reasons, we see that the
caloric fluid theory is not a ‘special case’ of MKE, because there is no special case of MKE that caloric
fluid exists, and thus no special case where the term ‘caloric fluid’ genuinely refers. 
This leaves us with a problem, if the caloric fluid theory of heat is false, and the term ‘caloric fluid’ does
not genuinely refer, why did the theory work for as long as it did? Why was a non-referential theory able
to make so many accurate predictions? Why are we able to use the models presented by the theory to
model and optimize many engines and power generation cycles? 
We now know that heat isn’t some form of caloric fluid, but the mean kinetic energy of atoms and
molecules.  We have also observed that MKE posits  entities and structures of reality that in no way
resemble the entities and structures that the caloric fluid theory posits. In many ways, though, heat in
the  MKE  theory  behaves  in  a  manner  that  one  would  expect  a  fluid  to  behave.  The  models  and
relationships (particularly the relationship between temperature and entropy) derived from the caloric
fluid model have stood the test  of  time far better than caloric  fluid theory itself.  This  seems to be
because, while ‘caloric fluid’ could not have accurately referred to actual caloric fluid, it did genuinely
refer to some underlying structure. More so, this structure, while in most respects completely different
from caloric fluid, is relevantly similar to caloric fluid when it comes to certain behaviors of heat and
relations of heat. 
Now consider the wave theory  of  light.  Initially  this  theory stated that light  was a transverse wave
travelling through ether. This, too, was a very successful theory in its time. Despite its success, the theory
was  shown  to  be  incorrect.  Initially  the  theory  was  reduced  to  a  transverse  wave  in  ether  to  an
electromagnetic transverse wave that no longer required ether to move through. The theory was then
replaced by the current theory where light has both the properties of a wave and a particle, leading to a
‘wavicle’ theory of light. Let’s consider the evolution of the theory in three stages:
1. Light is a transverse wave traveling through ether
2. Light is an electromagnetic transverse wave traveling through space
3. Light is a wavicle
Stage one replaced a particle theory of light due to a number of successful predictions that effectively
showed the transverse wave theory to be more empirically adequate than its predecessor. This theory
was then genuinely referred to light as waves and to some sort of ether that the light travelled through.
When the theory moved into stage two the properties of electromagnetic waves no longer required
ether to move through. Ether was summarily dropped from the theory of light. Ether was no longer
believed to be genuinely referring to any entity that existed in the world. Over time anomalies arose
from the electromagnetic wave theory and theories of light entered stage three. Simple electromagnetic
waves were no longer thought to be genuinely referring. 
Progressing from stage two to stage three of the theory of light is much like the previous example of
caloric fluid. A theory posited entities and structures that didn’t exist in reality, but described the world
that was relevantly similar to reality in how it relates to empirical evidence and for it’s the contemporary
mathematical modeling of the time.
The case of progressing from stage one to stage two is a different. Rather than moving from one system
of beliefs and models, the theory seemed to remain the same in most manners, but the presence of
ether simply fell out of the theory without having being replaced. This seems to be confusing a singular
hypothesis  (the existence of  ether)  and an entire  theory  (light  is  a  transverse wave through ether).
Hypotheses do not exist in a vacuum though. The ether hypothesis can only be posited with a transverse
(pre-electromagnetic) wave, and the existence of light as a transverse (pre-electromagnetic) wave only
can be posited with an ether. When the theory was proposed, it was believed that waves could not move
without a medium to travel through, so it would have been irrational to suggest that light did not have
this  medium. Since the hypothesis  came together as a set,  not individually,  we can see that this  is
actually not a case of a term merely falling away, not genuinely referring to anything, but an entire
system being replaced by a newer, more empirically adequate system. The replaced system was at the
time of  its  adoption,  the most empirically  and super-empirically  acceptable,  and over its  life  as the
predominant theory of light posited many new predictions that were empirically adequate. This was not
a miracle or coincidence, but because it described reality in a way that is relevantly similar to how the
newer, better theories that we now use, and more importantly, it describes the world in a way that is
relevantly similar to the world. 
In both of these examples there were theories that were thought to genuinely refer to entities and
structures in reality, but these entities and structures do not in fact exist. These theories did describe the
world though, but not in a way that genuinely referred.  They provided models that were relevantly
similar to reality. These models were then replaced with other, superior models that, due to their greater
empirical  support,  seem to  have  more  similarity  to  reality.  These  models  will  then  be  replaced  by
superior models that are more similar still. 
This,  obviously,  applies  to  our  contemporary  theories.  Take  our  theories  in  quantum physics  about
quarks. The theory is  not actually  positing the existence of quarks as we know them, and thus not
genuinely referring to quarks. What the theory is positing is that there exists something in nature that
behaves similarly to the quarks we have posited in ways that are relevant to the model. 
Looking at science as the development and testing of models that are relevantly similar to reality would
allow for the ‘no miracles’ argument for scientific realism without having to accept or believe that the
current body of scientific knowledge genuinely refers to entities in reality, nor would it have to commit
to our current body of knowledge being “right”. 
This differs from anti-realism in that the anti-realist position is that observation does not give us any
knowledge about the underlying structures and entities,  just  that those entities are only posited as
predictive aids,  not  as  entities  that exist  in the world.  Anti-realists  are not claiming to  refer  to  the
unobserved world in any way. The difference is that the relevantly similar model is that the model is
referring to an entity that, while not identical to the entity posited by the theory, is similar to the posited
entities in a relevant manner. 
On Relevant-Similarity
This,  of  course,  brings  about  the  question  “What  does  it  mean  to  be  relevantly  similar,  exactly?”
Outdated theories have been shown to have some level of similarity with the replacing theories, but
what is the nature of this similarity? 
The most intuitive answer to this question is that the old theories are mathematically similar to the way
the  world  is,  or  in  other  words  that,  while  the  terms  used  in  the  theory  are  incorrect  and  the
relationships posited in the theory are described wrong, they get the math right, or close enough. The
numbers work out. By using a fluid model of heat, Carnot was able to come up with a set of equations
that predict how heat would behave. It  could then be said that the term ‘caloric fluid’  was just the
trappings for the isothermal process equations. Similarly  the ether and waves of light were just the
backdrop  for  the  mathematics  of  light.  One  of  the  main  reasons  this  seems  promising  is  that  the
carryover from the old theory to the new theory is often in the equations. Heat isn’t thought of as a fluid
when a Carnot cycle is developed and the concept of light doesn’t regress when refraction is calculated,
the equations are just used. Another reason the idea of mathematical relevance is appealing is because
the mathematical rigor of the sciences is often what seems to set the sciences apart from other forms of
study, so it seems fitting for mathematics to be central to a theory of relevance about the sciences.
While initially promising, it seems to run into three main problems. The first is that these mathematical
equations don’t exist in a vacuum. They refer to entities and the relationships between entities. When
velocity is treated as the derivative of position with respect to time, it isn’t the equation v=dx/dt on its
own, it is the motion of an object measured as the rate of change of position of that object. If then the
theory that the equations were developed off of (or that was developed out of the equations) drops
away, then the equations are lost as well. One could respond to this criticism by saying that it is more of
a feature than a bug. Once the old theory falls away, the equations aren’t lost, as shown by the fact that
they are still  used. When the new theory comes along they are ported over to it,  referring to new
entities or newly understood versions of the old entities. How these equations stay and evolve would
then just go to show that they are in fact the relevant part of the theory. While the rest falls away, they
remain.
The question, then, is “why do they remain?” or “in the development of our theories, why do we stick
with the equations?” The answer to this seems to be that we stick to them because they work. The math
does work out. By the math works out it is meant that the equations make accurate predictions. They
then are modified to make more accurate predictions and are said to refer to different entities that they
then make predictions about. This leads us to the next problem with this view, that is, if the equations
are central and the theories around them are secondary, and the centrality of the equations is due to
their predictive accuracy, then hasn’t this theory just fallen back into full-blown anti-realism? By focusing
on the equations of the theories and their predictive power, hasn’t the scientific theory become merely
a predictive aid rather than a description of the actual world? It seems that as the theory as a whole
loses its primacy to the mathematical component of the theory, any form of realism becomes harder and
harder to maintain.
A third objection to this view would be that it requires all sciences to be mathematizable. Moreover, it
would not just require the sciences to be on a path towards being mathematized, but to be currently
mathematized in order to be a science. This would seem to write off many of the life sciences as well the
infancies of the harder sciences. This would make the sciences a much more exclusive group of studies
than most people would be willing to grant.
Upon  viewing  the  shortcomings  of  a  mathematically  relevant  similarity,  one  could  then  go  in  the
opposite direction. Relevant similarity could be framed as a historical or contextual phenomenon. This
would be saying that the similarity between theories would be defined by their own historical context
and in each case of theory transition could be explicated based on the previous and replacing theories.
Furthermore, due to the diversity of scientific practice any attempt to systematize relevance would be
doomed to fail. This too, has its problems. First off, it seems to simply avoid the question it is trying to
answer. When asked how “relevant similarity” works, it shrugs and says that it has to look at things on an
isolated, case by case basis. That is not a fulfilling answer to the question. The idea can be defended
though by  saying  that,  while  yes  it  is  unfulfilling  that  our  theory of  relevance isn’t  universal  to  the
sciences and to scientific theory, neither are our sciences. The methods of experimentation and how
theories are developed isn’t unified across scientific disciplines and paradigms, so why would our theory
of relevance need to be? Relevance within biology can be different than relevance in quantum physics
which in turn can be different than relevance in thermodynamics,  just  as the methods of biological
experimentation, thermodynamic experimentation, and the experimentation in quantum physics are all
different. 
Another hang up with the historical approach is that it has reduced itself to being merely descriptive, in
that it can only speak of past cases of relevance. It requires the replacing theory to be available to speak
about how the old theory was relevantly similar to the new theory, and presumably reality. Since we
don’t know what scientific theories will replace our current scientific theories, this theory of relevance
cannot speak to our current scientific theories.
Conclusion
Instances of the general realist position that scientific terms genuinely refer have been shown to be false
throughout the history of science.  It seems unfounded and arrogant to believe that current scientific
terms genuinely refer in spite of this history, to believe that “we have gotten it right this time”. Both
sides, then, are still left with the problem of how science could be successful if it does not genuinely
refer to the entities and structures in the world. More so, they are left with the problem of how past
theories that have been shown to be non-genuinely referential were empirically adequate, and are in
many cases still pragmatically adequate. 
An answer to this conundrum is that the scientific terms and theories, rather than genuinely referring to
entities  and structures  are  models  referring  to  a  world  that  is  similar  to  the models  that  they are
presenting  in  a  relevant  manner.  This  idea  can  both  explain  why  current  theories  make  accurate
predictions and why old theories worked as well as they did for as long as they did before being replaced
by models that were more similar. In this we have a form of realism that does not rely on the genuine
reference of terms but grants an account of science that doesn’t rely on a miracle.
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